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"WHEN WE WERE FIRST PAID"
THE BLACKFOOT TREATY, THE WESTERN TRIBES, AND
THE CREATION OF THE COMMON HUNTING GROUND, 1855

WILLIAM E. FARR

In mid-October of 1855, Blackfoot Treaty
commissioner Isaac 1. Stevens, governor of
Washington Territory and ex-officio its superintendent of Indian Affairs, and his cocommissioner Colonel Alfred Cumming, head
of the Central Superintendency including Nebraska Territory, finally assembled the Blackfoot Peace Council just below the confluence
of the Judith and Missouri Rivers. The federal
government through the Office of Indian Affairs by then had already pieced together a

new reservation policy for the West. This "new
order of things," largely designed by Commissioner of Indian Affairs George Manypenny,
hoped to reduce white conflicts with Indians,
to prevent, if possible, expensive military actions, and above all to extinguish Indian land
title by purchase, thereby enabling "legitimate"
white settlement. In doing so, the new policy
went well beyond the government's earlier and
more limited goals of keeping immigrant trails
free of hostile Indians and of creating a peaceful, federal dispensation or order on the Great
Plains by means of annual compensation.!
The Blackfoot Council and the treaty that
emerged from it, often termed Lame Bull's
Treaty, however, did not fit the new reservation policy. It extinguished no aboriginal land
title through land sales or cessions, nor did it
provide for Indian removal to reservations
where the government could establish schools,
hospitals, and mills and provide farming instruction and moral guidance. Nor did the
treaty advance the division of communal lands
in order to allot small parcels to individual
Indians. It was not a so-called land treaty at
all; it was a peace treaty. And it contained a
surprise-the federal creation of a common
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FIG. 1. Isaac Ingalls Stevens (1818-1862). First
Governor of Washington Territory and Commissioner
at the Blackfoot Treaty. Courtesy of K. Ross Toole

FIG. 2. Col. Alfred Cumming, Commissioner at
the Blackfoot Treaty. Drawing by Gustavus Sohon .

Archives, The University of Montana.

Courtesy of Washington State Historical Society,
Tacoma.

hunting ground. This designated area was to
be shared "in peace" by the Blackfoot tribes
and what were termed the "Western Indians,"
those who had come from west of the Rocky
Mountains, across the continental divide, from
the drainages of the Columbia River. These
Western Indians were the Nez Perce, Yakima,
Walla Walla, Cayuse, Kootenai, Spokane, and
numerous Salish speakers, most prominently
the Flathead and the Pend d'Oreille.
The formal establishment of such a common hunting ground in October of 1855 flew
in the face of much of the emergent reservation policy. Instead of being encouraged to
establish fixed and permanent homes, namely
reservations, for exclusive tribal use, and to
stay put, Stevens's federal recognition and formal establishment of a "buffalo commons"
stimulated the bison hunters of the Columbia
River drainages to continue their long, seasonal migrations to the contested buffalo plains

centered at the headwaters of the Missouri
and Yellowstone Rivers just as they had always done.
Where did the Blackfoot Treaty commissioners find the precedent for such a common
hunting ground and what lay behind their
willingness to establish it on the buffalo plains?
Could this divergent, if not contradictory, regional determination in the Far West be reconciled with the prevailing federal reservation
policy as determined by the Office of Indian
Affairs? Or was that unnecessary, given that
American reservation policy in the 1850s was
by its nature contradictory, little more than a
series of regional improvisations?2
Commissioners Stevens and Cumming, of
course, did not actually "create" the common
hunting ground. They simply acknowledged
and restructured the reality of a preexisting
Indian common hunting ground, a sort of buffalo commons, that gradually over the years
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Fig. 3. "Blackfoot Council - 1855." Drawing by Gustavus Sohon. Courtesy of Washington State Historical
Society, Tacoma.

had been constructed through war, treaties,
and diplomacy on the part of the tribes themselves. Stevens had first encountered this dynamic tribal creation with its shifting
boundaries and alliances when he led a congressionally funded transcontinental railroad
survey through the middle of Blackfoot territory in 1853. Two years later, not only did
treaty commissioners Stevens and Cumming
recognize this Indian construction in the treaty
provisions in 1855, they gave it an inordinate
amount of attention. What were their goals
and expectations regarding the federal definition, limitation, and reshaping of this preexisting regional Indian commons? How did these
purposes relate to possible repercussions for a

bison population, already perceived to be dwindling on the Northern Plains?

***************
Long before Lewis and Clark wrote of the
Cakahlarishkit, or the river of the road to
buffalo, in July of 1806, Indian tribes west of
the Rocky Mountains had crossed the continental divide on their way to hunt buffalo on
the open plains of the upper Missouri,
Yellowstone, and Musselshell Rivers. There,
Western Indians from the distant reaches of
the Columbia Plateau and the tangle of mountain ranges that would become Idaho and western Montana seasonally competed with a
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FIG. 4. Map showing the Territory of the Blackfeet and the common Hunting Ground of the Blackfeet and
Western Indians as established by the Treaty at the mouth of the Judith, 17 October 1855. Courtesy of National
Archives, Records of Bureau of Indian Affairs, RG75, Microcopy T-494, Roll 5, Frame 1093.

welter of Plains people for hunting access to
the immense herds of buffalo. The most important of these Plains tribes were those of the
Blackfoot Confederacy, consisting primarily
of Blood, Blackfeet proper, and Piegan, along
with their allies, the Gros Ventres, and the
Crow, Sioux, and Cree.} In the hunting parlance of the nineteenth century this was called
"going to buffalo." It would be for many of the
Western Indians a right and a passion essential to their culture and one they swore never
to give Up.4
While Indian initiative to "go to buffalo"
would always remain decisive, Governor
Stevens's 1855 signature treaty solutions in
Washington Territory also came to playa significant role. In these treaties Stevens formally
recognized the right of the Western Indians to
continue to "go to buffalo" from their newly
established reservations, and with this right,
the de facto existence of a buffalo common

hunting ground on the plains of what would
become Montana. Both acknowledgments
encouraged a more active interest in buffalo
hunting and an even greater Western tribal
presence east of the Rockies.
The evidence for a buffalo hunting commons, where rival tribal entities and bands
hunted, clashed, allied, socialized, and traded
on the Upper Missouri and Yellowstone drainages, is remarkably rich throughout the nineteenth century. As early as in the journals of
Lewis and Clark it was amply documented. In
fact, not only was it recognized, but William
Clark linked the existence of such a war zone
or no-man's-land to the unusual abundance of
big game populations, especially bison, that
the Corps of Discovery encountered there. s
This phenomenon of a contested ground,
shared in common by a number of tribes, was
also attested to by the German physician F. A.
Wislizenus. In 1839 he remarked that buffalo-
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hunting Indians "recognize certain districts,
where buffalo usually abound, as common
hunting and war ground." There the various
tribes "roam at will, subjecting their conflicting rights to the test of strength. Between the
tribes there is perpetual warfare."6
While portions of the Western Indians had
always gone to buffalo, they did so in increasing numbers after the arrival of the horse. Buffalo hunting became a regular activity and
could not be stopped. Both Francois Larocque
in his journal of 1805 and Ross Cox puzzled
over this preoccupation to go each fall to "the
fork of the Missouri or there about to kill Buffaloes," and both concluded that the only reason they could discern for the Western Indians'
willingness to fight constant and losing battles
with the Blackfeet and other tribes on the east
side of the Rocky Mountains was their love of
the buffalo. 7 The journals of David Thompson
and Alexander Henry the Younger reinforce
this view and are replete with references to
the numerous alliances the Western tribes
constructed in order to compete with the more
numerous and dominating Blackfeet. In the
1840s Father Nicolas Point, who traveled with
the Flathead and Pend d'Oreille on their annual winter hunting expeditions to the common hunting ground, related other firsthand
examples of bloodshed, peace delegations,
horse raids, truces, trading, and hospitality.
There existed, then, an ongoing "bison diplomacy" between the contending if unequal
tribes that was vibranr, intensely dynamic, and
nothing like the picture of unremitting and
unrelieved warfare so often portrayed.
By the time Governor Stevens reached Fort
Owen in the Bitterroot Valley in 1853, he
knew from his own experience that the Western Indians, as well as the Blackfeet, Crow,
and Shoshoni, all hunted bison around the
Three Forks of the Missouri, the Musselshell,
and the upper Yellowstone country . Two years
later at the Walla Walla Council in 1855 he
told the Yakima and Nez Perce, "I have met
you in the trail. I saw your people in buffalo
country. I met your people on the road to buffalo country."8 He knew as well from numer-
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ous personal conversations that each of these
tribal enrities maintained that it had done so
since time immemorial. As a result of that
personal experience, when Stevens had his
1854 "Map Showing the Indian Tribes of
Washington Territory and on the Missouri and
its Tributaries" drawn up and submitted to
Washington, D.C., he clearly identified this
long-standing neutral territory that was occupied at various times by all, but controlled by
none, as "Common Hunting Grounds of the
Blackfeet, Crows, and the Indians of Washington Territory." In Stevens's mind there was
no question about its existence. 9
By December 1854 and throughout the following winter and spring, Governor Stevens
implemented a new federal reservation policy
in western Washington Territory. He did so
by means of a series of treaties in which he
extinguished Indian aboriginal title and removed the various tribes and consolidated fragments to designated reservations. By May 1855
Stevens had moved his treaty tour east of the
Cascade Mountains. There, he and his Oregon counterpart, Governor Joel Palmer, conducted at Walla Walla a treaty council with
the Plateau tribes on both sides of the Columbia River. Hoping to make the land sales more
palatable, the two commissioners promised
that not only would the treating tribes of Nez
Perce, Yakima, Walla Walla, and Cayuse receive government compensation for their
lands, but also they would be able to conrinue
hunting, gathering, and fishing in the lands
they had sold or ceded-as they had always
done. Governor Palmer, attempting to sweeten
the agreement, described the policy this way:
"[W]e buy your country and pay you for it and
give the most of it back to you again."l0
As attractive as that proposal was, Stevens
upped the ante by holding out the promise
that those same off-reservation rights, exercised in what was phrased "usual and accustomed places," could be extended even beyond
the claimed and then ceded territory in question-in other words, even to the buffalo hunting ground beyond the Blue Mountains and
beyond the Rocky Mountains, some 400 to
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600 miles away from their newly designated
reservations. This was a remarkable concession to local Plateau subsistence patterns. It
was also a significant departure from Stevens's
earlier treaties. Even more remarkable was
Stevens's promise that the Columbia River
tribes would be able to do this without having
to constantly fear the harassment of Blackfoot
raiders as in the past. With federal support,
Stevens promised there would be equal access
and intertribal peace on the buffalo hunting
ground.
We want you to have your roots and to get
your berries, and to kill your game. We want
you, if you wish, to mount your horses and
to go to the Buffalo plains, and we want
more; we want you to have peace there. ll
With a pronounced flourish and knowing
full well the predictable response, Stevens trotted out a telling rhetorical question: who had
been disturbing them on their way to buffalo,
who had tried to keep them away from their
hunting ground on the Missouri and Yellowstone, stolen their horses and murdered their
men, women, and children'? Was it the whites?
Of course not. The answer was clear to all-it
was the Blackfeet. "We want that to cease
forever," Stevens said. "If we can agree here,
this you will be able to say to the Blackfeet
and the Blackfeet will say 'We will be friends,
we will chase the buffalo together on the plain,
we will be friends forever.">[2 Stevens had already laid plans for formal federal recognition-and regulation-of the preexisting
Indian common hunting ground, a recognition that only confirmed its existence and the
entitlement, by prescriptive use, of the W estern Indians to hunt there.
Given these promises at Walla Walla, it
was appropriate that in Stevens's next effort,
the Hellgate Treaty with the Pend d'Oreille,
Flathead, and Kootenai, he would repeat his
pledges to establish an intertribal peace across
the continental divide in buffalo country. Conducted in July 1855 at the confluence of the
Bitterroot and Clark Fork Rivers, Stevens told

Victor, whom he had selected as head chief
for the consolidated three tribes, that he expected to make "a treaty which will keep the
Blackfeet out of this valley, and if that will
not do it we will then have soldiers who will."
He added that he had been directed to make
this treaty by the President and that "we hope
it will forever settle your troubles with the
Blackfeet."13 "Going to buffalo" loomed large
in the subsequent negotiations. It even affected
the decision as to which valley west of the
Continental Divide was the better choice for
the site of the consolidated reservation-the
Bitterroot favored by the Flathead or the Mission Valley selected by the Pend d'Oreille and
the KootenaL l 4
The long-anticipated Blackfoot Peace
Council was the final stop in Governor
Stevens's ambitious treaty tour. Although
scheduled for late September in Fort Benton,
the council did not actually open until 16
October. It had been put off as a result of
numerous delays in transporting critical treaty
goods up the Missouri. Even the venue had to
be changed. Instead of Fort Benton, the commissioners and Indians met 100 miles downstream just below the mouth of the Judith River
on the north bank amid the leafless, bare cottonwoods. Here at the confluence of the two
rivers, the Missouri and the Judith, called the
Big River and Yellow River by the Blackfeet,
Stevens made good his earlier promises to bring
together the far-flung tribes and bands of the
so-called Blackfoot Nation, the Nitzitapi, who
straddled both sides of the forty-ninth parallel from the Yellowstone River in the south
to the Red Deer River in the north. IS He also
brought to the Judith representatives of the
Plateau and Mountain Indians from across
the divide in Washington Territory, led by a
strong, well-armed Nez Perce contingent and
the various elements of the recently created
Flathead N ation. 16 In addition, there was one
Plains Cree chief, Broken Arm, already celebrated for his efforts at brokering peace between the Cree and the Blackfeet. Well
traveled, Broken Arm had been to Washington, D.C., in 1831-32, and in 1851 he had
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attended the Fort Laramie Treaty Council
where tribal boundaries on the Northern Plains
were "discussed and mapped." Broken Arm, or
Maskepetoon, came with the Piegan leader
Little Dog bearing tobacco as a delegate for
both the missing Cree and their frequent companions, the Assiniboine. 17 The Crow, too,
were conspicuously absent, although not by
design, as were Shoshoni elements. Even so,
the eventual distribution of provisions on the
treaty grounds indicated the presence of some
3,295 Indians, who represented a total census
of some 15,500. 18
The treaty that emerged from this belated
Blackfoot Council, because of its intent toward peace, was something of a throwback to
1851 and the Treaty of Laramie. Neither had
as its purpose the sale or acquisition of Indian
lands for white settlement or the extinguishing of native land title. Nor did either treaty
establish small, formal reservations of Indian
land that were to become "fixed, permanent
homes" for exclusive tribal use as required by
the new policy coming from the Indian Office. 19 Instead, both aimed at establishing "permanent relations of peace and amity"- in the
case of the Judith Treaty, between the various
Blackfoot tribes "hunting and trading on
American soil" and the US government. In
addition, the Judith River council was to initiate intertribal peace between those same
Blackfoot bands and tribes and their competing neighbors, with a special insistence upon
peace with the Western Indians.
The Blackfoot Council, like its earlier counterpart for the "nations of the Prairie and
Mountain Indians" at Fort Laramie, amounted
to a federal attempt at establishing a peaceful
dispensation on the Northern Plains. Peace
was critical in Stevens's eyes. Two years before, with energy and great organizational skill,
he led the Northern Railroad Exploration and
Survey through the heart of Blackfoot country. For this northern route to be competitive
with the other transcontinental railroad surveys, Stevens felt he had to pacify the Blackfeet
and their neighbors. Moreover, his newly created Washington Territory was attracting im-

13 7

..... ,.\:0.,., -t.. .....
rt."41 -I ~ r" t. ),J;..,....;..FIG. 5. "The Broken Arm (Maske-pe-town) , Chief
of the Cree Indians." Drawing by Gustavus Sohon.
Courtesy of Washington State Historical Society,
Tacoma.

migrants and capital, and he had almost completed his task of clearing Indian title to most
of the territory's lands, preparing them for
extensive settlement. Consequently, when he
later functioned as a Blackfoot Treaty commissioner, Stevens was determined to install
the permanent peace his survey and Washington Territory required. 20
Ensuring intertribal peace, in the view of
the government and its two resident commissioners, rested on two assumptions, both previously explored at Laramie. The first was
compensation for Indian losses of game, grass,
and wood; the second was the desirability of
establishing carefully defined and designated
tribal territories, with specific boundaries.
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FIG. 6. "The Bloods Come in the Council, Blackfeet
Camp, 1855." Drawing by Gustavus Sohon. Courtesy

of'Washington State Historical Society, Tacoma.

These were viewed by government officials as
necessary steps in removing many of the causes
of intertribal war on the buffalo plains. Both
Stevens and Cumming would also insist upon
what the Indians called "lines."21
While the Laramie Treaty had asked tribal
members to stay within their designated
boundaries, it had not meant they were to "surrender the privilege of hunting, fishing or passing over any of the tracts of country herein
before described."22 The Judith Treaty would
not demand this either-as long as peace prevailed. Nonetheless, both treaties promoted
the idea that if the Indians remained in their
own territories, intertribal peace would be
easier to secure. Territorial segregation was
the key. It would also allow federal authorities, if need be, to identify Indian parties responsible for depredations, even pinpointing
specific bands that ignored the commitments
of tribal leaders and broke the peace. Building

on this Laramie pattern, Stevens and Cumming
also devised provisions for guaranteed rightsof-way, the establishment of military forts, and
the creation of telegraph installations. The
idea in 1855 was to secure an American peace
for this sprawling expanse of high plains, as
previous negotiators at Laramie had done.
But things had changed. A new federal reservation policy in 1855 had replaced the Fort
Laramie model. Stevens's own treaties, from
Puget Sound to Hellgate, had reflected these
changes and were certainly preferable, from
the government's perspective, to the Laramie
example. Nonetheless, Stevens and Cumming
returned to the model of 1851, as it was simply too early to pursue the new reservation
policy with the more nomadic bison hunters
of the Northern Plains. This was especially so
since no white settlement was contemplated.
Consequently, the Indian Office addressed the
problem of intertribal war and the growing
threat of Indian-white hostilities by simply
promoting peace and territorial segregation.
Again, as at Laramie, the Indian Office held
out the reward of government compensation.
Indemnification would make up for the Indian losses of large amounts of grass and
timber and for the ever-declining game populations occasioned by white expansion.23
Had the 1851 Fort Laramie Treaty dealt
with all tribal lands south of the forty-ninth
parallel, US-Blackfoot tribal relations,
whether good or bad, would have already been
in place. But that was not the case. It was not
addressed because the federal mandate in 1851
concerned only those tribes and lands south of
the Missouri and north of Texas and New
Mexico. Rather, it was left to future agreements to establish federal relations, to say
nothing of peace, in the vast buffalo commons
between the Missouri River and the Canadian
border, east of the continental divide.
Besides failing to have provided the proper
purview, the Treaty of Laramie had not even
lived up to its own promises, as Governor
Stevens himself was quick to point out.
"Tribes, parties to the Treaty of Laramie,"
Stevens related, "are now at open war with
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the Government, and the employment of four
thousand troops, and an expenditure of, say,
two million dollars is the price now being paid
by the Government for the management of
the Indian, in a comparatively small portion
of the jurisdiction of the western superintendency."24
The situation in 1855 on the Northern
Plains was somewhat analogous to the preLaramie-treaty conditions. Land sales were not
called for and tribal territories prior to both
treaties remained largely undefined, with the
tribes migrating, mingling, fighting, and competing in what appeared to be a chaotic freefor-alL Yet the differences were significant.
New initiatives were clearly needed. From the
perspective of the Indian Office in Washington, D.C., and of treaty commissioners like
Stevens and Cumming, the major difference
was that they now recognized all too well that
war had to be prevented. Military solutions
were too expensive. A more economical answer had to be found-even if that meant
greater concessions.
It was unlikely that a treaty consistent with
the newly emergent reservation policy could
be concluded with the militarily powerful
Blackfeet, Crow, Gros Ventre, and Assiniboine. These nomadic hunters had been unwilling to sell their land. It was doubtful
whether they would compromise their freedom by acquiescing to definite boundariesto being penned in-or to a white-brokered
peace. Concessions would have to be negotiated with the tribes in the form of increased
annuities, greater recognition of home territories, and more support for federal aid in the
form of agencies, schools, missions, shops,
hospitals, and yearly presents of useful goods
and provisions. There needed to be something akin to a reservation treaty with an
expanded agency plant, but one that would
retain significant regional freedoms appropriate to a nomadic, buffalo-hunting people.
Another consideration pushing innovation
was the promises Stevens had made on the
part of the government at Walla Walla and
Hellgate to ensure the continued right of the
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Western Indians to "go to buffalo," in other
words, for the various bands and intertribal
alliances to access the rich buffalo hunting
ground they had shared in war and in peace
across the Rocky Mountains.
Innovation may have been needed at the
Blackfoot Council, but the portents were not
auspicious. Contention between Governor
Stevens, whom the Blackfeet called "Short
Man," and his equally strong-minded co-commissioner, Colonel Cumming, reigned from
the beginning. 25 Only with difficulty could they
agree upon anything, certainly anything having to do with their respective official responsibilities, logistical support, or levels of treaty
compensation. The official bickering continued over the character of the Blackfeet and
the essential nature of the country they occupied. It was a surprise, then, to have both commissioners agree upon a rough determination
of Blackfoot and Crow tribal boundaries, ones
significantly different from those set down at
Laramie. It was even more astonishing to have
them issue a joint determination to designate
a "common hunting ground" along the lines
Stevens had already acknowledged and explored at Walla Walla and Hellgate. 26
Their proposed solution was to formally
define, by way of natural landmarks and geometric lines, a buffalo commons south of the
Missouri, north of the Yellowstone, and east
of the Continental Divide. This was arguably
one of the richest, most contested game arenas of the Northern Plains. In doing so they
clearly overturned and redrew the tribal
boundaries contained in the 1851 Laramie
accords. More creative and imaginative yet
was the insistence that in this "open" arrangement, the subscribing tribes
should all live in peace, stay home when
not hunting or trading and that the
Blackfeet collectively should agree and consent that what had been defined as Blackfeet
territory in the Laramie Treaty of 1851
should become a common hunting ground
for 99 years where all the signers, east and
west, shall enjoy equal privilegesY
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Article III of the eventual treaty had the
Blackfoot Nation as a whole consenting and
agreeing
that all that portion of the country recognized and defined by the Treaty of Laramie
as Blackfoot territory, lying within lines
drawn from the Hell Gate or Medicine Rock
Passes in the main range of the Rocky
Mountains, in an easterly direction to the
nearest source of the Muscle Shell River,
thence to the mouth of Twenty-five Yard
Creek, thence up the Yellowstone River to
its northern source, and thence along the
main range of the Rocky Mountains, in a
northerly direction to the point of beginning, shall be a common hunting ground
for ninety-nine years, where all the nations,
tribes and bands of Indians, parties to this
treaty, may enjoy equal and uninterrupted
privileges of hunting, fishing and gathering
fruit, grazing animals, curing meat and dressing robes.
This common hunting ground did not conform or agree with the boundaries of what
Laramie had erroneously described as "Blackfoot Territory."28
The Blackfoot treaty proposals in fact defined the lands between the Missouri and the
Yellowstone Rivers correctly for the first time.
Use of the territory in question did not belong
exclusively to the Blackfeet, however defined,
nor did they overwhelmingly and convincingly
occupy it, possessing it in the sense of controlling either the sweeping grasslands themselves
or access to them. This had been and would
remain something of a war zone-contested,
neutral, and therefore common ground on
which the competing and always moving tribes
shifted about like chess pieces as they wished
or dared.
Through their deliberate actions and diplomacy, the nomadic camps and alliances had
created a territory that was controlled by none
but hunted and used by all at various times in
the ebb and flow of tribal movements. The
Blackfoot tribes, for example, usually wintered

near the mountains, along the Marias, Two
Medicine, Belly, and Oldman Rivers. In late
spring, with the return of the green grass, many
of them moved east into the area immediately
west of the Cypress Hills. If the buffalo were
scarce in that quarter, they might decisively
move farther east, skirting around the Cypress
Hills. But if their scouts determined that the
Gros Ventre or Assiniboine were in that area,
they stayed away. Likewise, the Kootenai and
Salish would often slip over the mountains to
move in behind the Blackfeet after they had
left their wintering grounds for the high plains
in May. They would take their chances in what
they hoped would be vacant land. On still
other occasions the tribes asked permission to
hunt, relied on adopted relations, or negotiated a temporary peace between local bands. 29
The common hunting ground was not unvisited or uninhabited land. It was not an
empty land, as has been portrayed by Paul
Martin and Christine Szuter for an earlier period, although at any given time it may have
looked like one. 30 Nor was this arena just a
war zone. Numerous times the martial web
traced by the comings and goings of war parties and horse raiders collapsed. Temporary
treaties and awkward truces were forged, after
which carefree hunting, peaceful socializing,
and intertribal trade reigned. Stevens recognized this fundamental fact of tribal reality
and, together with Cumming, designated and
described the territory for what it was-a common hunting ground founded upon multiple
tribal movement and multiple use.
Such places and practices, while seldom
exact, were not uncommon. 3l These often surfaced without design, as terrain became more
or less neutral, more or less dangerous, and
particularly if it was geographically large,
poorly defined, or only sporadically defended.
Sometimes they cropped up as buffer zones
between or within shifting tribal occupations.
In other cases, there were conscious efforts to
establish neutral zones or common hunting
grounds. So, for example, following the
Laramie Treaty of 1851, the Crow and the
Miniconjou Sioux, for their mutual benefit,
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FIG. 7. Map of the area between the Missouri and Arkansas Rivers and northwestward to the Columbia River
showing various Indian tribes, to Col. D. D. Mitchell by P-J. DeSmet, S.]., 1851. Records of the Department of
Interior, Office of Indian Affairs , RO 75, Map No . 251. Courtesy of the Mansfield Library, University of
Montana 040501851 .US.

agreed to share and use jointly the seam of
territory between their Laramie-designated
boundaries. Referred to as the "Neutral
Grounds," age-old enmities were set aside in
order to enjoy the benefits of safe hunting and
of passage through each other's territory to
expand trading opportunities. 32
Then, too, there were sacred places such as
Medicine Mountain, where a shared common
spiritual purpose created a zone of neutrality.
In such terrain hostilities and bloodshed were
to be set aside. Otherwise the sacred character
of the immediate landscape would be violated
to the detriment of the offender. 33 In other
cases fur trade posts functioned as a form of
common or neutral ground where band or
tribal entities momentarily set aside or inter-

rupted current animOSIties in the pursuit of
mutual self-interest. For Indian peoples that
interest could be access to Euro-American
trade goods or the goodwill or gifts of the fur
traders in charge who desired to foster regional peace, so necessary for success. Advantages and disadvantages were weighed and
m'inutely calculated on the part of the bands
and communities. Traders used their posts as
neutral sanctuaries as they sought to broker or
mediate peace. 34 Sometimes common ground
emerged along river or mountain corridors,
avenues of passage that could not be avoided
and were therefore unavoidably shared. As
with the buffalo commons, it was common
only in the sense that these corridors were
used by all, at different times, but alertly,
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quickly, and preferably in large numbers. The
Blackfoot treaty provision for a common hunting ground or a buffalo commons was not a
concept foreign to tribal experience.
Moreover, almost any landscape, even those
thought of as specific to a single tribe, could
regularly be penetrated or subject to shared
expedient use. This did not mean the Indian
tribes would take regular turns using this land
and exploiting its resources. It did not mean
there would be orderly spheres of influence or
a free-for-all in which the strongest prevailed.
And while Stevens and Cumming did not use
the term "common" to qualify the privileges
they described in the common hunting ground
provision, they did insert "common" in the
identifying label of the Indians' destination"the common hunting ground." In the opinion of the commissioners, in order for this
hunting ground to be durable and truly common, peace among the tribes would have to
prevail. 35 From the time of Walla Walia,
Stevens had proclaimed, "My heart said peace
in the buffalo country, peace here, peace is
here now, peace between yourselves, peace
between US."36
Over and against this n'ow designated and
delineated common hunting ground, the
Blackfoot Treaty in Article IV called for a
Blackfoot reservation of territory within the
United States that was to be theirs alone.
Neither this land nor its resources were to be
shared or held in common with any other tribe.
In the parlance of the new reservation policy,
which Stevens was anxious to adopt, if not
actually replicate, this land was to be exclusively theirs-"excepting as may be otherwise
provided in this treaty." There were two stipulations that did provide otherwise. The first
was the establishment of a ten-mile buffer
zone or neutral or demilitarized strip that ran
north of the common hunting ground boundary and parallel to the Musselshell from its
source to its mouth on the Missouri River.
Within this ten-mile zone there could be no
permanent villages and the Blackfeet would
not have or exercise "any exclusive rights."3?
They had given to the Western Indians the

right or liberty to hunt on the trail down the
Musselshell.
The second provision created an additional
common hunting ground on the eastern edge
of the Blackfoot territory where it abutted the
country of the Assiniboine.
Provided also, that the Assiniboines shall
have the right of hunting, in common with
the Blackfeet, in the country lying between
the aforesaid eastern boundary, running
from the mouth of the Milk River to the
forty-ninth parallel, and a line drawn from
the left bank of the Missouri River, opposite the Round Butte north, to the fortyninth parallel. 38
So, the Blackfoot Treaty recognized not just
one preexisting common hunting ground but
two. Yet of the two, it is the one with the
Indians to the west, across the Rocky Mountains, that dominated the Blackfoot Council
discussions. Objections immediately came
from the Western tribes and not from the
Assiniboine, who, although a party to the
treaty, were not present. These objections reveal much about the character of the tribal
links to the bison grounds both inside and
outside of the treaty-designated common hunting ground.
Alexander, the Pend d'Oreille chief who
had been so effective in the Hellgate Treaty
negotiations, bitterly protested the restricted
routes over the divide to the buffalo, as well as
the proposed limitation to hunt only within
the common hunting ground. "A long time
ago our people, our ancestors, belonged in this
country ... around the Three Buttes," he said,
meaning the Sweetgrass Hills on the Canadian border, smack in the middle of Blackfoot
country. "We had many people on this side of
the mountains. When my father was living he
told me that was an old road for our people."39
His second criticism was not unlike that which
he had made at the Hellgate negotiation:
We Indians were all well pleased when we
came together here in friendship. Now you
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point us out a little piece of land to hunt
our game in. When we were enemies I always crossed over there, and why should I
not now when we are friends .... Which
of these chiefs [pointing to the Blackfeet]
says we are not to go there? Which is the
one?40
Little Dog allowed that he had raised the issue, not because he wanted to be unfriendly
but because "the North Blackfeet might make
a quarrel if you hunted near them. Do not put
yourself in their way."41 Such sparring was a
further reminder that each band, to say nothing of the various tribal elements in the
Blackfoot confederacy, acted independently
and that the whole of the country was at times
a "war zone," although it was penetrable under the right circumstances and therefore part
of the Indian commons.
Alexander would not let it drop. He wanted
to continue travel to the buffalo hunting
ground through the northern passes, those
north of the treaty-sanctioned Hellgate Passes,
by which he meant principally Marias and Cut
Bank. "The Chief [Stevens] tells us that we
are all, all of us Indians, to eat out of the
same plate, one plate. Now you tell me to quit
crossing in the North. I wonder how this can
be?"42 Why were they, the Kootenai and the
Pend d'Oreille, to say nothing of the others,
to be restricted? Alexander's fellow tribesman
Big Canoe concurred. He wanted no restrictions at all: "I thought our roads would be all
over this country. Now you tell us different."
Big Canoe must have been referring to how
Stevens, as "soldier chief," had promised the
Salishe and Kootenai government protection
and help against the Blackfeet so that they
could hunt buffalo east of the mountains.
The implication had been, at least from their
perspective, that they could hunt wherever
they wanted. Big Canoe recognized the consequences. "Supposing that we do stick together and do make a peace .... Now you tell
me not to step over that way. I have a mind
to go there."43 Both Big Canoe and Alexander
had a point. Since their "common hunting
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ground" included all Blackfoot territory south
of the forty-ninth parallel, why should they
agree to a limited and smaller commons, even
with government guarantees?
Given the vociferous objections, Little Dog,
chief of the Black-Patched Moccasin band of
the Piegans, retreated, saying "Since he
[Alexander} speaks so much of it, we will give
him liberty to come out in the North."44 Commissioner Cumming, using a map, tried to
make Alexander understand that the whole of
the territory had been designated as belonging to the Blackfeet at the Fort Laramie Treaty
and that the commissioners were now being
most generous in transforming the southern
portion into a federally broke red "common
hunting ground." Stevens chimed in with another rationale:
In making this division we looked to the
Indians obtaining their living. The Western Indians have enough in the piece given
them in proportion to their numbers ....
The Western Indians are only one fourth as
numerous as the Blackfeet. Let Alexander
think of this. He does not get all his food
from the Buffalo. He has farms and cattle.
The Blackfeet have none. 45 (Stevens
thought the Blackfeet to number in excess
of 11,000.)
Finally, the Piegan Chief Lame Bull, also
called Nee-ti-nee or "The Only Chief," reminded everyone in attendance, especially the
Salish and Nez Perce so proud of their
longstanding friendship with the whites, that
it was not the Blackfeet who had sought out
this treaty nor had they written it.

It is not our plan that these things are going
on. I understood that what the White
Chiefs told us to do, we were to do both
sides. It is not we who speak. It is the White
Chiefs. Look at those tribes (pointing to
the Western Indians), they are the first to
speak, making objections this morning. We
intend to do whatever the Government
tells US. 46
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Stevens should have anticipated these
Salish and Nez Perce concerns. Anything that
altered the subsistence round generated anxiety, especially changes in the way the bands
hunted buffalo. However reasonable from the
government's perspective, the geographical
limitations, the restriction on their liberty to
go where they wanted or dared, as represented
by designated common or exclusive ~pheres,
was a palpable sacrifice. It was like a big-city
politician gerrymandering voting districts to
suit his own self-interest. The federal government was attempting to engineer a precisely
drawn new world order, to reshape use-rights
in an Indian-created buffalo commons, and
the Pend d'Oreille did not like it. The Nez
Perce and Flathead probably did not like the
situation either, but there is no record that
they objected. More likely, they decided to
save their words and do what they wanted, as
they always had. If the treaty could replace a
war-zone commons with a peaceful, government-designated, common hunting ground
that offered better hunting and other advantages, they could reconsider. The key issue
was the condition of peace. Although limited
and circumscribed, a peaceful commons might
be truly preferable to the larger commons
where warfare was a constant. The Salish verb
for "going to war" meant "stealing horses." In
the new peace of the federal common hunting
ground, the Blackfeet duly promised the Salish
"they would go home on as good horses as they
came on."47 Possibly there were advantages to
peace.
But what if the buffalo were uncooperative
and would not stay put in the common hunting ground? What if the buffalo could not be
found in sufficient numbers within the designated "lines," as was the case that very year,
1855? The tribal parties from west across the
mountains had just experienced real want, if
not actual starvation, as they assembled in or
near what would be named the common hunting ground, preparatory to the council. Severe
drought dominated in every direction. Bison
had not been seen in the Musselshell country
for over six weeks. Grass was so scarce that the

Flathead and the Nez Perce resorted to felling
cottonwood trees along the small watercourses
to feed their horse herds. 48 Farther south, other
Nez Perce hunting parties, finding "few buffalo and small game scarce," split up, with some
traveling as far south and east as below the
confluence of the Big Horn and Yellowstone
Rivers into Crow country.49 As for the Blackfeet themselves, Bad Head, or "Father of Many
Children" as he was known when he signed
the Judith Treaty, designated 1854 in his winter count as "Itaomitaohoyop," or "when we
ate dogs"-a disastrous condition. 50
Bison were mysterious animals. 51 Their location and movement were never to be taken
for granted. Frequently they seemed propelled
by spirits or offended by humans; they were
subject to various levels of hunting pressure,
to weather and climate changes, to grass fires
and blackened prairies, to changes in winter
forage, and who knew to what else. If buffalo
were not presently to be found in the common
hunting ground, when would they return? If
they drifted on and off a particular and bounded
landscape willy-nilly, what logic was there to
restricting tribal hunting to a limited and particular tract of land, especially one so small
and restricted?
Stevens and Cumming could be rather cavalier about buffalo hunting. Along with a good
many others, they did not believe that either
buffalo or Indian buffalo hunting had a bright
future. In his preamble to the treaty, even
before the various articles were read and translated, Stevens had set out the government's
hope and vision for the future.
We want to establish you in your country
on farms. We want you to have cattle and
raise crops. We want your children to be
taught, and we want you to send word to
your Great Father, through us where you
want your farms to be .... This country is
your home. It will remain your home. And
as I told the Western Indians we hoped ...
the Blackfeet would not live on poor Buffalo Meat but would have domestic Cattle
for food. We want them to have Cattle.
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You know the Buffalo will not continue
forever. Get farms and cattle in time Y
Indians were not so sure. The Blackfeet had
indeed complained that "the buffalo are not as
plenty as formerly, we have to eat too many
old bulls. "53 And in 1851 an Assiniboine chief,
The Bear, lamented to Father DeSmet, "I see
the buffaloes decrease every year. "54 Bad Head's
winter count for 1854 graphically reinforced
this perception. Yet not all Blackfeet or others were convinced that the losses were irreversible. After all, even amid the general lack
of buffalo numbers in the drought-stricken
summer of 1855, Stevens had reported large
counts between the Marias and the Milk River.
Maybe the bison would return in some equally
mysterious way. It was an open question. 55
Stevens hammered away on this pointthe buffalo cannot subsist forever. Whatever
Stevens's sincerity, he was not alone. A decline in bison numbers had become a generalized prediction since the 1840s. 56 The idea of
the disappearance of the buffalo as a major
source of Indian subsistence sometime in the
future was not confined to federal authorities
or missionaries pushing a pacific or agricultural agenda or hoping to establish a buffalo
commons in an effort to ease an Indian transition to civilization. With considerable sarcasm
the writer of the Fort Benton Journal, in September 1855, advised visiting native hunters:
"[Glo to it while you are young for when you
'get old' you will have no buffalo to kill as
Gov. Stevens' railroad hands will consume
them all."57
Times were troubled and difficult, for not
only were bison numbers in decline, tribal
populations were as well. Smallpox had ravaged the Blackfeet, the Blood and the Piegan
with particular intensity in 1837. The journal
of Lieutenant Bradley, relying on information from Alexander Culbertson, reported
that "among these three tribes not less than
six thousand perished, or about two-thirds of
their whole number-the very flower of the
tribes." Father Nicolas Point, writing a decade
later, concurred observing that the Blackfeet,
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FIG. 8. "Ne-tannay, The Only Chief' or "Stamyekh-sas-ci-cay, Lame Bull," Piegan Chief, 8 October
1855. Drawing by Gustavus Sohon. Courtesy of
Washington State Historical Society , Tacoma.

previously so numerous, had experienced an
alarming drop in numbers and had not recovered. "War, intoxicating liquor, small pox and
similar gifts presented to the people by the
white man," had reduced them, Point said, to
"a' third of what they had been a quarter of a
century before."58 The September 1853 report
of Blackfeet agent Alfred). Vaughan also reported "recurring waves of smallpox, measles,
and cholera, causing population losses."59 The
consequences of this level of depopulation and
the continuing threat of epidemics altered
band sizes, marriage patterns, hunting strategies, as well as alliances and political leadership. 60
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Blackfeet leaders groped in the changing
circumstances of population loss, bison scarcity or its threat, and the intensified intrusions of other tribes-Cree, Crow, Metis, and
SiOUX. 61 They willingly resorted to diplomacy,
to treaties, to giving peace and diplomacy a
chance-even if that meant confinement of a
sort. 62 Hudson Bay Company officials reported
that the Piegan, for instance, sent peace delegations to Edmonton in September 1855,
where a Piegan-Cree peace treaty emerged.
Later, fearful that the fragile peace would be
broken, tribes made new efforts at conciliation-this time to include wider involvement
by more tribes of the Blackfeet Confederacy.63
The Blackfeet seemed desperate for peace.
Peace would allow them to replenish their
numbers, to regain their equilibrium, and to
secure their territories against the ever more
aggressive assaults. Treaties are often signed
when leaders see no other choice. In like
fa.shion, the Metis, Sioux, and Chippewa
reached "a great treaty of peace" in July 1858
when they agreed that the Cheyenne River
was to be a dividing or boundary line between
their hunting territories. Should buffalo or
game become scarce on either side, the tribes
should "have the privilege of crossing over
said dividing line ... and should be welcomed
by said neighboring tribes." Indians did not
need federal white brokers to establish "common hunting grounds."64 They did it themselves.
On Wednesday, 17 October 1855, after
lengthy discussions of what the Blackfeet were
giving up "in their desire for peace and friendship," especially in granting the Western Indians the liberty to hunt on the trail down the
Musselshell to the Yellowstone, the Pend
d'Oreille and others agreed to the new boundary lines. 6s The Blackfeet Council thereby
avoided what had promised to be another
treaty stalemate, with bouts of acrimony and
posturing. Once again, as at Walla Walla and
Hellgate, Indian opposition in public to treaty
proposals quickly, miraculously, inexplicably
evaporated. When Commissioners Cumming
and Stevens reconvened the great council at

noon, the chiefs and headmen reviewed the
tribal boundaries with "the aid of a map and a
rough sketch of the country drawn on a buffalo skin." The written proceedings register
only compliance. No objections were recorded;
if there were any, they disappeared or were
swallowed.
In its final form the Blackfoot treaty contained sixteen articles. In addition to Article
III recognizing common hunting grounds with
its three provisos and Article IV defining the
territory over which the Blackfeet tribes would
"exercise exclusive control," the most important issue was how to get to the "common
hunting ground." This was taken up in Article
V. It provided detailed regulations limiting
the entry points the Western tribes were to be
confined to as they journeyed east. "They will
not enter the common hunting ground, nor
any part of the Blackfeet territory, or return
home by any pass in the main range of the
Rocky Mountains to the north of the Hell
Gate or Medicine Rock Passes." This comported with Stevens's assertion that the Western Indians "use certain passes. The Medicine
Rock, the Big Hole, and others further south."
Article VI completed the treaty discussion
of the common hunting ground by reminding
the signers that, when not hunting in the common hunting ground or going to it or returning from it, the tribes consented "to remain in
their own respective countries, except ... when
visiting each other for the purpose of trade or
social intercourse." The reason for this, explained Commissioner Cumming, was "only
to preserve their hunting grounds distinctly
apart .... The whites make these lines to show
where each must hunt so there shall be no
quarrels. "66
The remaining articles hollowed out or
lopped off considerable elements of tribal
independence. Although important to the
commissioners, these losses were of little significance to the Indian signers of the 1855
treaty. After all, there was nothing terribly
threatening or conspicuous about the concessions demanded of the Indians by the government. They would keep their lands or at least
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their rights to access the resources of those
regions, and after all, that was all they had
ever had. The chiefs and headmen of the bands
and tribes would retain their conventional
authority. If anything, that authority would
be intensified and extended. Tribal leaders
could see no danger of an imminent invasion
of great numbers of whites such as the country
to the south bordering the Oregon Trail had
experienced. In all the territories held by the
participating tribes at the council, white occupation was negligible. Nor was that expected
to change. If there was an erosion of tribal
authority and independence, it was insidiousinvisible to the stressed tribal leaders.
In essence, there were two visions of the
future represented at the council. The white
one saw the inevitable decline of the buffalo,
the continued, spiraling drop in Indian numbers, the coming of a general peace with the
establishment of isolated and permanent Indian reservations, and a mixed but asymmetrical Indian and white society amid the
establishment of a transcontinental railroad
and territorial growth. Opposing this was an
Indian vision featuring very limited change,
coupled with federal guarantees of continuity.
Above all, this Indian perspective would allow for the continued but peaceful tribal mobility across and within ceded lands and even
beyond into a shared Indian landscape, the
common hunting groundY Dogged persistence, a willingness to engage in endless if
intermittent skirmishes, and an irregular tribal
diplomacy had created that situation historically. With federal help this older Indian commons could be reshaped, limited, redefined,
and blessed with peace. The implications of
such actions in terms of either human or bison
numbers were not formally considered.
In return for the Indian concessions, the
United States agreed to spend $20,000 annually for ten years on goods and provisions, the
so-called annuities, for the tribes of the
Blackfoot Nation. In that same period an additional $15,000 would be spent annually on
farms and agricultural instruction, in educating children, and "in any other respect
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promoting their civilization and Christianization." Bad Head's winter count reinforced
the importance of the annuities and the
changes they signified when he recorded that
1855 was the year "when we were first paid."68
After a theatrical and idealistic last presentation by Commissioner Cumming, the commissioners signed the treaty, according to the
record kept, and were followed by the chiefs,
headmen, and delegates. "Great satisfaction
prevailed and every chief of any importance
signed the treaty."69
The Blackfoot agent Edwin A. C. Hatch
leveled a more realistic assessment. Not long
after Commissioners Cumming and Stevens
had left to return to their posts, Hatch confided to his diary
A man arrived from the Yellowstone (Fort
Union) last night with a letter dated Oct.
7th. Sioux threaten to besiege Fort Clarkso we here are between two fires, the Sioux
below and the combined tribes west of usand we are quiet in the center of the most
warlike and heretofore the most hostile
tribes on the continent, vis. the Blackfeet. 70

***************
Although the collected Blackfeet had anticipated a treaty of peace and amity to emerge
from the Blackfoot Council, they were initially unprepared to bargain in land, which
the common hunting ground provision required. By September, however, rumors began
to emanate out of Forts Benton and Campbell
on the Missouri indicating that something to
do with territory was afoot. James Doty, secreta~y for the Treaty Commission, while on the
Bow River in early September attempting to
drum up interest in the Blackfoot Council,
was asked whether it was true that the
Blackfeet would be asked to give up their lands
and hunting grounds south of the Missouri
River to "the Flatheads, Pend Oreilles and Nez
Perce for a home." The story, Doty reported,
was much discussed within the various camps,
and although Doty did his best to allay their
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fears, a number of leaders decided to stay
away.7l If the headmen were not there, they
reasoned, they could not be a part of any land
transaction. Although the rumors and leaks
did not get the details exactly right, the essence of the message was accurate-the US
government was going to give to the Western
Indians, in recognition of their longstanding
use, land east of the divide, and this would be
done at the Blackfeet's expense. It may not
have been the rumored "home," but it was
close to it, a kind of home away from home, in
the territory that had been previously assigned
to the Blackfeet alone by the Fort Laramie
Treaty.
Although both Commissioners Stevens and
Cumming had obviously agreed on the common hunting ground provision, Stevens appears, from the treaty discussions and promises
made at Walla Walla and Hellgate, in addition to his 1854 map, to have had the concept
of a common hunting ground in mind for some
time-certainly more so than did either his
colleague Cumming or the Indian Office in
Washington, D.C.
Further evidence for Stevens's principal
responsibility for the common hunting ground
designation can be found in the similarities
between the treaty provisions of his Washington treaties and those in the Judith Treaty.
The central feature of those earlier treaties
was the establishment of a fixed and permanent home-a reservation of a small portion
of their former lands-that was to be exclusively theirs. This policy had come out of the
Indian Office under Luke Lea, Charles E. Mix,
and George W. Manypenny. It did not represent Stevens's personal initiative. Stevens's
contribution, however, did surface when he
conceded to the Indians "rights of access to
the open and unclaimed lands" they had just
sold or ceded into the public domain. These
rights to hunt, fish, and gather as they always
had would now be exercised "in common" with
the citizens of the territory. It was this key
combination of Indian uses, exclusive and
shared, that became the stamp of Stevens's
innovative regional approach.

By recognizing a public area in Washington Territory to be shared "in common" by
Indian and white alike-until claimed by white
colonizers-Stevens explored new ground. It
was also a model that he thought could be
adapted to the sprawling Indian commons or
war zone that constituted the buffalo country
of the Northern Plains beyond the continental divide.
In line with his novel reservation policy,
Stevens decided to acknowledge an exclusive
territory for the American Blackfeet. Unlike
the small parcels on Puget Sound, however,
this reservation would closer resemble the
pastoral examples of the Plateau, only bigger.
In fact, the Blackfeet Territory could be huge.
Whites were not clamoring for lands there and
Congress could easily justify such a large reservation as politically acceptable. Adjacent
to this exclusive territory defined by the
Blackfoot treaty, Stevens established, as in
Washington Territory, a limited commonsthe "common hunting ground." It was defined
as "open and unclaimed" and would be held
"in common" for both the Blackfeet and the
Western Indians. These on-reservation and
off-reservation rights together formed a tidy
package designed to resemble the new federal
reservation policy enough to be reconcilable
with it, and yet to dovetail with the customary
buffalo hunting provisions of the treaties of
Walla Walla and Hellgate. Promises had been
made. Promises had been kept.
Again, Stevens did not have to create a
common hunting ground; all he had to do was
to recognize its de facto existence, structure it
by means of imposing boundaries and guarantees, and define the nature and kinds of activities that would take place there. It would not
be organic or dynamic as in former times. There
would be an artifice to this federal creation it
could not escape; its parentage was known.
But this federal child, however limited, would
permit the continuation of equestrian buffalo
hunting for both the Blackfeet and the Western Indians. In many respects the common
hunting ground was a human and moral concession to previous treaty commitments. It was
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also an expedient one on the part of a stingy
government.
Within the defined portion of the old contested territory, Stevens determined to transfer the essential intertribal peace of the west
side of the Rockies, so often associated with
the tribes of the Columbia Plateau, onto the
east side, inhabited by warring Indians and, at
the moment, sufficient bison. It was an engaging territorial mission. There was no acknowledgment, however, that peaceful common
access would further deplete scarce game populations. Maintaining a healthy bison population was not Stevens's goal; establishing peace
was paramount.
In retrospect, this formal creation of a defined, limited, and structured "common hunting ground" amounted to a kind of federal
seizure of the public domain prior to citizenship or any actual land transfers. It was a legal
"taking" as defined by the Fifth Amendment
to the US Constitution, for it laid down regulations and controls regarding which parties
were to be included, how they were to conduct themselves (peacefully), proper uses of
the resources available, and avenues of entry-to say nothing of determining how long
the federal creation would exist. And while it
may be argued there had been due process,
there had not been fair compensation, or, for
that matter, any compensation. If these standards applied to the property rights of citizens
subject to a common good, didn't they also
apply to dependent sovereigns?
The treaty also envisioned for this common hunting ground a military presence in
the form of forts and troops that would give
the government an enforcement apparatus
should it be needed. Finally, the creation of
the common hunting ground was considered
a temporary and expedient solution. It would
meet immediate needs, buying time until a
treaty of cession could be negotiated and a
complete reservation policy effected.
What the government needed was time to
institute a full reservation effort at moderate
expense, not to protect the declining buffalo
resource. Whether the government's view rep-
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resented keen observation or simply the assumptions associated with a political and cultural agenda is almost beside the point. With
the buffalo becoming increasingly scarce, the
tribes would lose the incentives to undertake
the long, difficult pilgrimages into either a
peaceful buffalo commons or hostile territory
and thus would remain in their home orbits.
That would not only be to their advantage but
would relieve some of the hunting pressure on
those unpredictable pockets of bison that remained on the Northern Plains. On the other
hand, if the tribes were determined to continue to go to buffalo, Stevens felt they needed
to avoid the persistent and debilitating tribal
altercations formerly attendant upon bison
hunting. Otherwise, the martial ethos now so
disruptive to the government plans for territorial development would persist as long as
the buffalo.
The trick was to keep the common hunting
ground viable long enough to accomplish the
tribal passage from a hunting and foraging
culture to one of "civilization" and agriculture. This was no easy task. Persistent fear of
attack and staggering war losses, deadly disease pathogens, and liquor had imposed in the
earlier contested commons informal, but very
real, limits to tribal buffalo hunting. Once
those obstacles were lessened, would hunters
from all sides converge onto the buffalo commons, both old and new, where peace was now
so encouraging? Would implosion occur?72 The
answers to these questions dealt not only with
the perception of bison numbers and locations
but with the Indians themselves. Many whites
were just as convinced that the Indians were
disappearing, although it was never clear to
nineteenth-century observers whether it was
the Indian population or their culture that
was vanishing, or both. Still, these were parallel trends, and in the minds of many, their
convergence would make the ninety-nine-year
life span of the common hunting ground sufficiently long. Then, too, the federal military
presence would constitute a regulating mechanism on the movement of the tribes or on the
exploitation of bison resources. If that were
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not enough, a fully implemented and successful reservation policy would provide the means
and the social pressure for the tribes to stay
home.
Together, these constraints in the minds of
the commissioners would be enough to ensure
the continuing presence of the buffalo and the
vitality of the common hunting ground-at
least in the short term. As early as 1839 the
Indian and the buffalo had been described as
"Siamese twins" who would perish together. 73
We know the analogy was wrong. Stevens,
however, would not take a chance. He sought
to separate the twins, weaning the buffalo Indians from the nomadic life and substituting
in its place reservations, stock, and agriculture. But that would take time. If the western
tribes and the bison did not perish together,
certainly they would negotiate together the
inevitable transition that time would bring.
Meanwhile, the common hunting ground was
th:e government's safety valve, for it would
relieve economic pressure to support the transition. If the buffalo and Indians should somehow unexpectedly survive in the common
hunting ground, then the ninety-nine-year
lease would run out. In fact, the federal common hunting ground was negotiated out of
existence within ten years and the buffalo were
all but gone in thirty. Yet in concept, the common hunting ground was an experiment-an
ameliorating one, given government parsimony-and a necessary if temporary stage in
the Indians' hope for survivaL
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